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Abstract
We study the optimal control problem of minimizing the convergence time in the discrete Hegselmann–
Krause model of opinion dynamics. The underlying model is extended with a set of strategic agents
that can freely place their opinion at every time step. Indeed, if suitably coordinated, the strategic
agents can significantly lower the convergence time of an instance of the Hegselmann–Krause model.
We give several lower and upper worst-case bounds for the convergence time of a Hegselmann–Krause
system with a given number of strategic agents, while still leaving some gaps for future research.
1 Introduction
The dynamics of opinion formation using agent-based models has been studied for more than half a
century, see e.g. [12] for a (partial) overview of different models. Here we consider one specific model,
which generated at lot of research papers in the social simulation community, the so called bounded
confidence model also known as Hegselmann–Krause model. As originally defined in [14], see also [12],
the Hegselmann–Krause model considers discrete time and a finite set of agents with opinions in Rd (or
R as a special case). At each time step the opinion of every agent is updated by averaging certain other
opinions. However, an agent is influenced only by those opinions that are near to his or her own opinion.
We will give a precise specification of the model in Section 2.
One key issue of a model for opinion dynamics is the question of convergence, see e.g. [3, 13, 18, 22, 17].
Here by convergence we mean a final stable state, where the agent’s opinions remain the same in all
subsequent time steps. Some authors also say that the system is in equilibrium or has frozen. If
convergence is guaranteed, the next question is about the necessary number of time steps to reach this
state. For the Hegselmann–Krause model the convergence time has been upper bounded by nO(n) in [5].
The author’s conjecture of a polynomial convergence time was, to the best of our knowledge, first proven
for the special case of dimension d = 1 in [19]. Their upper bound O(n5) was subsequently improved to
O(n4) in [23] and to O(n3) in [2, 21]. A polynomial upper bound for a general dimension d was presented
in [2]. For dimension d = 1 a Ω(n) worst-case lower bound was given in [19]. This was improved recently
to Ω(n2) in [10]. For dimension d = 2 an example yielding a lower bound of Ω(n2) was also given in [2].
Some first few exact values of the worst-case convergence time in dimension d = 1 were determined in
[16] using integer linear programming techniques.
Recently researchers started to look at the problem of controlling or steering an instance of an
opinion dynamics system towards a desired state, see [24, 1, 11, 4]. Exogenous interventions into the
systems dynamics were e.g. studied in [20, 7, 6]. The desired state in [11] is a conviction interval, i.e., a
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subset of the opinion space. The practical problem that one can have in mind is that of a political or
commercial campaign. Via media channels, speeches or personal communications the opinion dynamics
can be influenced. Formally such a controllable exogenous influence was modeled by introducing strategic
agents in [11]. Here we will use strategic agents to accelerate the convergence time in the Hegselmann–
Krause model, i.e., we study the optimal control problem minimizing the convergence time.
The remaining part of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we formally introduce the
Hegselmann–Krause dynamics with strategic agents and collect some theoretical observations about the
system dynamics. The optimal control problem is studied in Section 3, i.e., we give several lower and
upper worst-case bounds for the convergence time of a Hegselmann–Krause system with a given number
of strategic agents. We draw a conclusion and propose some future lines of research in Section 4.
2 The Hegselmann–Krause dynamics with strategic agents
As originally defined, the Hegselmann–Krause model considers a one-dimensional continuous opinion
space R 1, a set N = {1, . . . , n} of agents – these are the non-strategic agents – and discrete time. At
each time t ∈ N each agent i ∈ N has a certain opinion xi(t) ∈ R. The opinion of an agent i ∈ N is
influenced at time t only by those agents which have a similar opinion, more precisely, where the distance
of the respective opinions is at most ε. In our rescaled version of an opinion space R we can assume
w.l.o.g. ε = 1. The new opinion xi(t+ 1) of agent i is then determined as the mean of all opinions
2 that
influence agent i at time t.
Here we want to extend the model by strategic agents. To this end we denote the set of strategic
agents by S and the set of all agents by A = N ∪ S. The opinion xs(t) of a strategic agent s ∈ S can
be freely chosen at each time t ∈ N as any real number. However, determining the new opinion at time
t+ 1, the non-strategic agents make no difference by whom they are influenced. To be more precise, we
set
xi(t+ 1) =
∑
j∈A:‖xi(t)−xj(t)‖≤1
xj(t)
|{j ∈ A : ‖xi(t)− xj(t)‖ ≤ 1}| (1)
for all i ∈ N . Here, ‖ · ‖ denotes the Euclidean norm (or the absolute value, as it makes no difference
in dimension 1). As a model extension we may also use Equation (1) for strategic agents at time steps
where they do not freely reset their opinion. However, in this paper we assume that each strategic agent
freely chooses an opinion at every time step.
We say that two agents i, j ∈ A are neighbors at time t if ‖xi(t) − xj(t)‖ ≤ 1, which induces an
influence graph Gt. For brevity, we denote the neighborhood of an agent i ∈ A at time t by Ni(t) =
{j ∈ A : ‖xi(t)− xj(t)‖ ≤ 1}, i.e., the set of neighbors. With this, Equation (1) can be rewritten to
xi(t+ 1) =
∑
j∈Ni(t) xj(t)/ |Ni(t)|.
The Hegselmann–Krause dynamics, with or without strategic agents, is rather complicated and hard
to treat analytically, i.e., besides convergence not too many theoretical results are known. For the special
case of dimension 1 at the very least the ordering of the opinions of the agents is preserved, as observed
in several papers, see e.g. [15, Lemma 2]:
Proposition 1 If xi(0) ≤ xj(0) for i, j ∈ N , then xi(t) ≤ xj(t) for all all t ∈ N.
This well known observation is clearly also true, if strategic agents are present. If i or j is a strategic
agent, then we can not have such a result, since, by definition, strategic agents can choose their opinion
freely. W.l.o.g. we assume xi(0) ≤ xj(0) for all i ≤ j, i, j ∈ N in the remaining part of the paper.
For dimension 1 and the absence of strategic agents there is another well known theoretical insight.
If two agents i and j are, at a certain time step t, in two different connectivity components of Gt, then
this property will be preserved for all times t′ > t. As a consequence, if ‖xi+1(t) − xi(t)‖ > 1, then
‖xi+1(t′)− xi(t′)‖ > 1 for all t′ > t (using the assumed ordering of the starting opinions). However, this
needs not to be true if at least one strategic agent is present. It can indeed be easily shown, see e.g.
1In some papers the unit interval [0, 1] or other intervals of the real line are used. For a finite number of agents those
variants are equivalent via scaling.
2Note that every agent influences itself.
[11], that one strategic agent suffices to bring any configuration of starting positions to a consensus in a
finite number of time steps, i.e., the opinions of all non-strategic agents coincide after some rounds.
For the other direction we remark that it is almost always possible, given a suitably large number
of strategic agents and time steps, to move the opinions of any two non-strategic agents as far apart
from each other as desired. If albeit xi(t) = xj(t), where i, j ∈ N , at a certain time t, then we have
xi(t
′) = xj(t′) for all t′ > t, independently of the precise opinions of the strategic agents.
Definition 2 For each x ∈ R and each t ∈ N we define the weight of x at t as wt(x) = |{i ∈ N : xi(t) = x}|.
With this, the weight of agent i ∈ N at t is defined as wt(xi(t)).
Proposition 3 We have 0 ≤ wt(x) ≤ n and wt(x) ∈ N for all x ∈ R, t ∈ N. For all t ∈ N and all i ∈ N
we have wt(xi(t)) ≤ wt+1(xi(t)), i.e., the weight of a non-strategic agent is weakly increasing.
If we use the strategic agents to control the system dynamics, we can ensure that some properties
will be preserved if we choose the opinions of the strategic agents accordingly. To this end we denote by
N ′i (t) = {j ∈ N : ‖xi(t)− xj(t)‖ ≤ 1} the set of non-strategic neighbors of a non-strategic agent i. The
graph arising from Gt by restricting the vertex set to non-strategic agents is denoted by G′t. With this
we can state:
Definition 4 We call a non-strategic agent i ∈ N frozen if |N ′i (t)| = wt(xi(t)). For the vertex set C of
a connectivity component of G′t we denote by l(C, t) the agent with the smallest index in C and by r(C, t)
the agent with the largest index in C. The width w(C, t) of C at t is given by xr(C,t)(t)− xl(C,t)(t) ∈ R≥0.
Due to our assumed ordering of the starting opinions, we have xl(C,t)(t) ≤ xi(t) ≤ xr(C,t)(t) for all
i ∈ C, i.e., l(C, t) and r(C, t) mark the ends of the interval of connectivity component C and w(C, t)
denotes the corresponding length. We remark that w(C, t) = 0 if and only if all non-strategic agents of
C are frozen at time t.
Proposition 5 Given two non-strategic agents i, j ∈ N and a time t ∈ N we have xi(t+ 1) = xj(t+ 1)
if and only if Ni(t) = Nj(t).
If the influence graph G′t at time t decomposes into the connectivity components C1, . . . , Ch, then we
denote the width of the entire configuration, i.e., the sum over the widths of the connectivity components,
by w(G′t, t) =
∑h
i=1w(Ci, t).
The width of a connectivity component can only increase if a strategic agents is placed behind the
ends of the corresponding interval but still within the influence range.
Proposition 6 Let C be a connectivity component of the influence graph G′t at a certain time t ∈ N.
If we have xa(t) ≥ xl(C,t)(t) and xa(t) ≤ xr(C,t)(t) for all i ∈ C and all a ∈ Ni(t), then we have
xl(C,t)(t) ≤ xj(t+ 1) ≤ xr(C,t)(t) for all j ∈ C.
So, one can place the opinions of the strategic agents such that the width of the entire configuration
does not increase.
Since the range of influence is at most 1, each non-strategic agent can not move too far within one
time step.
Proposition 7 For each i ∈ N and each t ∈ N we have ‖xi(t)− xi(t+ 1)‖ ≤ 1.
We say that the system has converged at time t if all non-strategic agents are frozen, i.e., if we have
for every i, j ∈ N either xi(t) = xj(t) or ‖xi(t) − xj(t)‖ > 1. Without the influence of any strategic
agents, we may simply assume that they all place their opinions far apart or at one of the positions xi(t),
the opinions of the non-strategic agents will remain unchanged, i.e., stable for all times t′ > t. However,
the strategic agents may convert frozen agents to non-frozen ones. This can make sense, if one wants to
end up with a consensus. Nevertheless, we define the convergence time of a Hegselmann–Krause system
(HK system for short) as the smallest time t such that the system has converged at time t. Obviously
this definition of convergence time depends on the starting opinions xi(0) of the non-strategic agents
and all opinions xj(t), or rules to compute them, of the strategic agents. As already observed in the
introduction, the convergence time of a HK system with n non-strategic agents and no strategic agent is
upper bounded by O(n3), while the slowest known sequence of examples reaches Ω(n2). In the following
section we will consider the optimization problem of lowering the convergence time using strategic agents,
i.e., we consider an optimal control problem.
3 Lowering the convergence time using strategic agents
Given a HK system we ask how to optimally coordinate the opinions of the m = |S| strategic agents
so that the convergence time is minimized, i.e., we consider an optimal control problem. We call the
corresponding time the optimal convergence time, given the starting positions of the non-strategic agents
and the number m of strategic agents. Mostly we will be interested in general assertions than consid-
erations of specific examples. So, by f(n,m) we denote the supremum of the optimal convergence time
over all HK instances with n non-strategic agents and m strategic agents. In this notation our current
knowledge on the convergence time can be written as f(n, 0) ∈ O(n3) and f(n, 0) ∈ Ω(n2). Obviously,
we have f(n,m) ≤ f(n′,m) and f(n,m) ≥ f(n,m′) for all n′ ≥ n and all m′ ≥ m.
We start by considering the case of m = 1 strategic agent and mimic the proof strategy for the best
known upper bound of the convergence time from [2].
Lemma 8 Given a HK system with m = 1 strategic agent, the opinion of this agent at time t can be
chosen in such a way such that either
(1) the weight of a non-strategic agent increases and the width w(G′t, t) does not increase or
(2) the width w(G′t, t) decreases by at least 1n+1
at time t+ 1, whenever the HK system has not converged at time t.
Proof. Let us denote the connectivity components of G′t by C1, . . . , Ch. If there exists an index 1 ≤
g ≤ h with 0 < w(Cg, t) ≤ 1, then we can place the opinion of the strategic agent far away from the
other opinions so that no agent is influenced. Since w(Cg, t) ≤ 1 we have ‖xi(t) − xj(t)‖ ≤ 1, so that
xi(t+ 1) = xj(t+ 1) for all i, j ∈ Cg. As w(Cg, t) > 0 the weights of the agents in Cg increase by at least
1 each in this case. Obviously, the width of the influence graph does not increase.
Otherwise we choose an index 1 ≤ g ≤ h with w(Cg, t) > 1 and set xs(t) = xl(Cg ,t)(t) + 1, where s
denotes the strategic agent. With this we have
xl(Cg ,t)(t+ 1) =
1
|Cg|+ 1 ·
xs(t) + ∑
i∈Cg
xi(t)
 ≥ xl(Cg ,t)(t) + 1n+ 1 ,
since xi(t) ≥ xl(Cg ,t)(t) for all i ∈ Cg and |Cg| ≤ n. Using Proposition 6 we conclude w(Cg, t + 1) ≤
w(Cg, t)− 1n+1 . The widths of the other connectivity components do not increase. It may happen that a
certain connectivity component, e.g. Cg itself, decomposes into several components in the considered time
step, i.e., Cg may not be a connectivity component at time t+1. Nevertheless, the summed widths of the
respective components is not larger then it was originally, while in one component of Cg a contraction of
at least 1n+1 occurs. Thus, we have w(G′t+1, t+ 1) ≤ w(G′t, t)− 1n+1 . 
Corollary 9 f(n, 1) ∈ O(n2).
Proof. Since the weight of every agent is a non-negative integer being at most equal to n and it is
weakly increasing over time, Case (1) of Lemma 8 can occur at most n2 times. (A more refined analysis
would yield that we need to consider this case at most n − 1 times.) Since the maximum difference
between two neighbored agents is 1, we have w(G′0, 0) ≤ n− 1. Thus, Case (2) of Lemma 8 can occur at
most (n− 1) · (n+ 1) ≤ n2 times. 
Using one strategic agent the upper bound for the (optimal) convergence time could be improved from
O(n3) to O(n2), but still we do not know whether the strategic agent was necessary, since f(n, 0) ∈ O(n2)
may also be true. To see, that already one strategic agent can significantly decrease the (optimal)
convergence time we consider a specific parametric example:
Lemma 10 For n ∈ N consider the HK system with starting opinions xi(0) = i − 1 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
i.e., the equidistant configuration. The convergence time of this example is in Ω(n) while its optimal
convergence time for m = 1 strategic agent is in O
(
n3/4
)
.
Proof. Via induction one can easily show that xi(t) = i− 1 for all t+ 1 ≤ i ≤ n− t, i.e., the movement
starts from the two ends of the chain of neighbors and concerns two additional agents at each time
step. Thus the convergence time is at least n−22 . Actually, the convergence time of the equidistant
configuration is given by 5n6 +O(1). An exact formula was stated in [16] without a proof and rigorously
proven in [9].
For the other direction we assume w.l.o.g. n ≥ 34 = 81 and set k = ⌊n1/4⌋. At the beginning all n
non-strategic agents are in a single connectivity component and each neighbor of an agent is distance 1
apart. We inductively will cut off groups of k agents.
At step 1 there are n remaining agents with distances 1, . . . , 1. Let x1 be the position of the opinion
of the kth non-strategic agent at time 0. Setting the opinion of the strategic agent s to x1 − 1 at time
0, the first k non-strategic agents are separated from the last n − k ones at time 1. For the remaining
steps we ignore the first k agents.
At time 1 the distances between the remaining n − k agents are given by 1, . . . , 1, 12 . For step 2 we
consider the opinion x2 of the kth non-strategic agent counted from the right at time 1. Setting the
opinion of the strategic agent to x2 + 1 at time 1, the last k non-strategic agents are separated from the
first n− 2k ones at time 2. For the remaining steps we ignore the last k agents.
At time 2 we have to consider n− 2k agents with distances 12 , 1, . . . , 1. So, up to symmetry we are in
the same situation as in the previous step. We iterate the separation process using the strategic agent
until we end up with at most
⌈
n3/4
⌉
+ 2 groups of cardinality at most k after at most
⌈
n3/4
⌉
+ 2 time
steps.
The dynamics of each of these groups can be considered separately. After the separation process
has finished we place the opinion of the strategic agent far away from all other opinions so that it does
not play a role. Since any HK system with at most k non-strategic agents converges in O(k3) time, the
overall convergence time is in O
(
n3/4
)
. 
Next we consider the example from [10] yielding the quadratic lower bound bound f(n, 0) ∈ Ω(n2):
Lemma 11 For an integer k ≥ 10 we consider the so-called dumbbell configuration with 3k + 1 non-
strategic agents, where
(1) k agents have starting opinion − 1k ,
(2) one item has starting opinion i for each 0 ≤ i ≤ k, and
(3) k agents have starting opinion k + 1k .
The convergence time of this example is in Ω(n2) while its optimal convergence time for m = 1 strategic
agent is in O
(
n3/4
)
.
Proof. The convergence time of the dumbbell configuration has been already treated in [10], so that
we only consider the optimal convergence time.
At time t = 0 we place the strategic agent at 2. Using the usual ordered numbering of the non-
strategic agents, we obtain
• xi(1) = − 1k+1 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k, xk+1(1) = 0,
• xk+2(1) = 54 , xk+3(1) = 2, xk+4(1) = 114 ,
• xk+1+i(1) = i for all 4 ≤ i ≤ k, and xj(1) = k + 1k+1 for all 2k + 2 ≤ j ≤ 3k + 1.
At time t = 1 we place the strategic agent at k − 2. With this, we obtain
• xi(2) = − k(k+1)2 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k + 1,
• xk+2(2) = 138 , xk+3(2) = 2, xk+4(2) = 198 ,
• xk+5(2) = 92 , xk+1+i = i for all 5 ≤ i ≤ k − 4,
• x2k−2(2) = k − 114 , x2k−1(2) = k − 2, x2k(2) = k − 54 ,
• x2k+1(2) = k − 1(k+1)(k+2) , and x2k+1+i(2) = k + k(k+1)2 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
At time t = 3 the agents k + 2, k + 3, and k + 4 will converge to the joint opinion 2. Similarly, at time
t = 4 the agents 2k − 2, 2k − 1, and 2k will converge to the joint opinion k − 2. The last k + 1 agents
will converge to a joint opinion at time t = 3. The remaining agents from k+ 5 to 2k− 3 form a chain of
(almost) equal distances, i.e., with a single exception all distances are equal to 1, while the exceptional
distance is equal to 12 – a case that has already been considered in the proof of Lemma 10. So, reusing
the corresponding reasoning, we conclude a convergence time of O
(
n3/4
)
. 
So, we have seen that the control of a single strategic agent can accelerate the convergence time
of the equidistant configuration by at least Ω
(
n1/4
)
. Improving the upper bound for the convergence
time f(n, 0), i.e., in the absence of strategic agents, would increase this gap even more. Besides a tighter
analysis, an improved strategy for the strategic agent is also conceivable. For the dumbbell configuration
the demonstrated acceleration is at least of order Ω
(
n5/4
)
. However, the power of a single strategic agent
alone is limited, as we will see in the next two results.
Lemma 12 For each integer k ≥ 21 consider the HK system given by
(a) k2 non-strategic agents with starting opinion −23 ,
(b) k non-strategic agents with starting opinion 0,
(c) k2 non-strategic agents with starting opinion 23 , and
(d) m = 1 strategic agent.
Let x1(t) denote the opinion of the agents in (a), x2(t) denote the opinion of the agents in (b), and x3(t)
denote the opinion of the agents in (c) at time t ∈ N. Then, for all 0 ≤ t ≤ k8 we have
(1) −23 − tk ≤ x1(t) ≤ −23 + tk ,
(2) 23 − tk ≤ x3(t) ≤ 23 + tk ,
(3) −
(
t
k +
t2
k2
)
≤ x2(t) ≤
(
t
k +
t2
k2
)
,
(4) x2(t)− x1(t) ≤ 1− 1k ,
(5) x3(t)− x2(t) ≤ 1− 1k , and
(6) x3(t)− x1(t) > 1
independently of the precise opinions of the strategic agent.
Proof. We remark that inequalities (4)-(6) say that the agents of type (a) influence agents of types (a)
and (b), agents of type (b) influence all non-strategic agents, and agents of type (c) influence agents of
types (b) and (c). The strategic agent may influence agents of none, some or all types.
We prove by induction on t and observe that for t = 0 all statements are valid. Now let t ∈ N, with
t ≤ k8 − 1, and we assume that all six inequalities are valid for t.
Since the strategic agent can pull with a force of at most 1, we have
x1(t+ 1) ≥ x1(t) + −1 + k
2 · 0 + k · 0
1 + k2 + k
≥ x1(t)− 1
k
(1)
≥ −2
3
− t+ 1
k
.
Using Inequality (4) at time t we conclude
x1(t+ 1) ≤ x1(t) +
1 + k2 · 0 + k · (1− 1k)
1 + k2 + k
≤ x1(t) + 1
k
(1)
≤ −2
3
+
t+ 1
k
.
So, Inequality (1) is also valid at time t+ 1. The validy of Inequality (2) is proven analogously.
In order to prove Inequality (3) we ask how left the opinions of agents of type (b) can be at time
t+ 1. The extreme situation occurs if the strategic agent pulls with force 1 to the left and the agents of
types (a), (b), and (c) are located as left as possible. So, we obtain
x2(t+ 1) ≥
−
(
1 + tk +
t2
k2
)
+ k2 · (−23 − tk)+ k · (0− tk − t2k2)+ k2 · (23 − tk)
1 + k2 + k + k2
= − 2tk + t+ 1
2k2 + k + 1
−
t
k +
t2
k +
t2
k2
2k2 + k + 1
≥ − t+ 1
k
− (t+ 1)
2
k2
.
Analogously, we conclude x2(t+ 1) ≤ t+1k + (t+1)
2
k2
so that Inequality (3) is also valid at time t+ 1.
Setting t′ = t+ 1 and using inequalities (1) and (3) at time t′, we have x2(t′)− x1(t′) ≤ 23 + 2t
′
k +
t′2
k2
.
For all 0 ≤ t′ ≤ −k + 13 ·
√
12k2 − 9k the right hand side is at most 1 − 1k . Since k ≥ 15 and t′ ≤ k8 we
have t′ ≤ k8 ≤ −k + 13 ·
√
12k2 − 9k, so that Inequality (4) is valid for all t ≤ k8 − 1. Analogously, we
conclude the validy of Inequality (5).
Setting t′ = t + 1 and using inequalities (1) and (2), we have x3(t′) − x1(t′) ≥ 43 − 2t
′
k ≥ 1312 > 1, so
that Inequality (6) is valid for all t ≤ k8 . 
Corollary 13 f(n, 1) ∈ Ω(√n).
We remark that the lower bound from Corollary 13 can be increased to f(n, 1) ∈ Ω(n2/3), see
Lemma 18. However, the result from Lemma 12 has the advantage, that it uses a connected starting
configuration (instead of many separated connectivity components) and does not rely on the convergence
analysis of the dumbbel configuration.
If the number of strategic agents is sufficiently increased, with respect to the number of non-strategic
agents, then the optimal convergence time can be decreased down to a constant.
Theorem 14 For each n ∈ N we have f(n, 9n) ≤ 2 and f(n, 9n) ∈ Θ(1).
Proof. At first we determine a set of positions where we place the opinions of the strategic agents in
the first round. To this end, let us denote the connectivity components of G′0 by C1, . . . , Ch. For each
index 1 ≤ i ≤ h we proceed as follows: We set wi = dw(Ci)e, i.e., wi is a non-negative integer such that
w(Ci) ∈ (wi − 1, wi]. For each connectivity component Ci we will use ki out of the 9n strategic agents in
the first round.3
If wi ≤ 1 we place strategic agents for Ci at ki = 0, i.e., no, positions. To ease the subsequent
notation we set pi0 =
1
2 ·
(
xl(Ci,0)(0) + xr(Ci,0)(0)
)
, i.e., we choose the center of the corresponding interval
of opinions.
Now assume wi ≥ 2. If wi is even, we place strategic agents at the ki = wi/2 positions pij =
xl(Ci,0)(0) + 1 + (2 + εi) · j, where 0 ≤ j < ki, j ∈ N. Here we choose εi > 0 suitably small such that
piki−1 ≤ xr(Ci,0)(0) and the open intervals (pij + 1, pij+1 − 1) do not contain opinions of non-strategic
agents at time 0 for 0 ≤ j < ki − 1. If wi is odd, we place strategic agents at the ki = (wi + 1)/2
positions pij = xl(Ci,0)(0) + (2 + εi) · j, where 0 ≤ j < ki. Here we again choose εi suitably small such
that piki−1 ≤ xr(Ci,0)(0) and the open intervals (pij + 1, pij+1− 1) do not contain opinions of non-strategic
agents at time 0 for 0 ≤ j < ki − 1.
With this we have xl(Ci,0)(0) ≤ pij ≤ xr(Ci,0)(0) for all 0 ≤ j < ki, i.e., strategic agents at these
positions influence only agents from Ci. Further more, if ki > 0, each agent in Ci is influenced by
3Note that an illustrative example will be given directly after Lemma 15.
strategic agents from exactly one position pij . It remains to determine the number of strategic agents
that should be placed at position pij .
Let b be the number of non-strategic agents with a starting opinion which is at most 1 apart from pij .
By a we denote the number of non-strategic agents with starting opinion in
[
pij − 2, pij − 1
)
. Similarly,
by c we denote the number of non-strategic agents with starting opinion in
(
pij + 1, p
i
j + 2
]
. We place
exactly 3 · (a+ b+ c) non-strategic agents at position pij at time 0. Let g be an arbitrary non-strategic
agent with starting opinion in
[
pij − 1, pij
]
and δ = pij − xg(0). With this we have
xg(1) ≥
a1 ·
(
pij − 1− δ
)
+ b1 ·
(
pij − δ
)
+ 3 · (a+ b+ c) · pij
a1 + b1 + 3 · (a+ b+ c) ,
where a1 ≤ a and b1 ≤ b. Since δ ≤ 1 and a1 + b1 ≤ a+ b+ c, we have
xg(1) ≥ pij −
2 · (a1 + b1)
(a1 + b1) + 3(a+ b+ c)
≥ pij −
1
2
.
For the other direction we have
xg(1) ≤
1 ·
(
pij − δ
)
+ 3 · (a+ b+ c) · pij + b2 ·
(
pij + 1− δ
)
+ c1 ·
(
pij + 2− δ
)
1 + 3 · (a+ b+ c) + b2 + c1 ,
where b2 ≤ b− 1 and c1 ≤ c. Since δ ≥ 0 and b2 + c1 + 1 ≤ a+ b+ c, we have
xg(1) ≤ pij +
2 · (b2 + c1 + 1)
(b2 + c1 + 1) + 3 · (a+ b+ c) ≤ p
i
j +
1
2
.
Similarly, we conclude pij − 12 ≤ xg(1) ≤ pij + 12 for every non-strategic agent g with starting opinion in[
pij , p
i
j + 1
]
.
If ki = 0, i.e., when we place no strategic agents for Ci, then we also have pi0 − 12 ≤ xg(1) ≤ pi0 + 12
for every non-strategic agent g ∈ Ci.
When determining the parameters a, b, and c for the strategic agents at the positions pij every non-
strategic agent is counted at most thrice, so that the number of placed strategic agents at time 0 is at
most 3 · 3 · n = 9n. We place the remaining strategic agents, if there are any, far away from all other
opinions, so that they do not influence non-strategic agents.
At time 1 the connectivity graph G′1 consists of unions of complete graphs, i.e., every non-strategic
agent i and every j ∈ N ′i (1) we have N ′i (1) = N ′j(1), since the opinions of the non-strategic agents are
clustered into intervals of length at most 1 at time 1.
No influence of strategic agents is needed to cause convergence at time 2, so that we place the 9n
strategic agents far away from the opinions of the non-strategic agents. Thus, we have f(n, 9n) ≤ 2. For
n ≥ 2 we can consider the example with starting positions given by i for all 0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1, which has
not converged at time 0, so that f(n, 9n) ≥ 1 for n ≥ 2 and f(n, 9n) ∈ Θ(1). 
We remark that essentially we have used the capabilities of external control in the proof of Theorem 14
in a single round only. Theorem 14 states that 9n strategic agents are sufficient to control any HK system
in such a way that it converges in a constant number of time steps. For n ≥ 5 the convergence is, in
general, as fast as possible, i.e. more strategic agents will not help to accelerate the convergence.
Lemma 15 For n ≥ 5 consider the example where the starting opinions of the non-strategic agents
are given by x1(0) = 0, x2(0) =
1
4 , x3(0) =
2
3 , x4(0) =
5
4 , x5(0) =
4
3 , and xi(0) = 6 for 6 ≤ i ≤ n.
Independently from the number m of strategic agents and their precise positions, the optimal convergence
time for this example is at least 2.
Proof. Since xi(0) ∈
[
0, 43
]
for all i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, we can use Proposition 7 to conclude xi(1) ∈
[−1, 73]
for all i ≤ 5 and xi(1) ≥ 5 for all i > 5. Due to Proposition 5 all non-strategic agents i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}
have different opinions at time 1. Thus, by the pigeonhole principle, there exist two non-strategic agents
i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} with 0 < ‖xi(1)− xj(1)‖ ≤ 1, i.e., the system has not converged at time 1. 
In order to illustrate the proof of Theorem 14, we consider an example: Assume starting positions
given by the vector x(0) = (0, 1.5, 2.4, 3.6, 4.5, 4.8, 5.1, 5.6, 5.9, 6.5, 6.7, 10, 10.7, 11.5, 11.9, 12.4, 13.3, 14.2),
i.e., we have n = 18 non-strategic agents and m = 162 strategic agents. G′0 consists of four connectivity
components with vertex sets {1}, {2, 3}, {4, . . . , 11}, and {12, . . . , 18}. The corresponding integers wi
are given by w1 = 0, w2 = 1, w3 = 4, and w4 = 5. According to the strategy proposed in the proof
of Theorem 14, we set p10 = 0, k1 = 0, p
2
0 = 1.95, k2 = 0, k3 = 2, and k4 = 3. Since w3 = 4 is even
we choose p30 = 4.6 and p
3
1 = 6.6 + ε3. Here, ε3 > 0 has to be chosen such that the open interval
(p30 + 1, p
3
1 − 1) = (5.6, 5.6 + ε3) is free of non-strategic agents, i.e., we have to guarantee ε3 ≤ 0.3.
The second condition p31 ≤ x12(0) yields ε3 ≤ 0.1, so that we choose ε3 = 0.1. Since w4 = 5 is
odd, we choose p40 = 10, p
4
1 = 12 + ε4, and p
4
2 = 14 + 2ε. Here the open intervals (11, 11 + ε4) and
(13 + ε4, 13 + 2ε4) have to be free of non-strategic agents, i.e., ε4 ≤ 0.15 is sufficient. The condition
p42 ≤ x18(0) on the other hand requires ε4 ≤ 0.1, so that we choose ε4 = 0.1. Since w1, w2 ≤ 1, we
place no strategic agents at p10 and p
2
0. For p
3
0, there are a = 0 non-strategic agents with an opin-
ion at time 0 in [p30 − 2, p30 − 1) = [2.6, 3.6), b = 5 agents in [p30 − 1, p30 + 1] = [3.6, 5.6], and c = 2
agents in (p30 + 1, p
3
0 + 2] = (5.6, 6.6]. Thus, we place 3 · (a + b + c) = 21 strategic agents at p30 = 4.6.
By the analogues consideration we determine that we have to place 18 strategic agents at p31 = 6.7,
12 agents at p40 = 10, 15 agents at p
4
1 = 12.1, and 9 agents at p
4
2 = 14.2. Having placed 75 out of the
162 strategic agents so far, we have to place the remaining 87 far away from all non-strategic agents,
e.g., at position 20.7. With this, the opinions of the non-strategic agents at time 1 are given by x(1) ≈
(0, 1.95, 1.95, 4.5522, 4.584, 4.664, 4.7115, 4.7885, 6.5391, 6.6045, 6.6524, 10.05, 10.1467, 12, 12.0722, 12.1368,
13.975, 14.1182). At time 1 we have 7 connectivity components, each of these having a width of at
most 1. Placing the strategic agents far away, e.g., at 20.7, the HK system converges to x(2) ≈
(0, 1.95, 1.95, 4.66, 4.66, 4.66, 4.66, 4.66, 6.5987, 6.5987, 6.5987, 10.0983, 10.0983, 12.0697, 12.0697, 12.0697,
14.0466, 14.0466) at time 2.
Lemma 16 For each c1, c2 ∈ R>0 and each α ∈ [0, 1) we have f(n, c1 · nα) ≥ c2 for all sufficiently large
n ∈ N.
Proof. We consider the HK system with
⌊
n
k
⌋
equidistant configurations consisting of k non-strategic
agents, where k = 2c2 + 2, each. The remaining n −
⌊
n
k
⌋ · k ≥ 0 non-strategic agents are placed far
away from the equidistant configurations. If one of connectivity components of G′0, corresponding to an
equidistant configurations, is never influenced by any strategic agent, then it takes at least c2 time steps
till convergence. Up to time c2− 1 at most c2 · c1 ·nα connectivity components of G′0 could be influenced
by at least one strategic agent. Thus, for n sufficiently large, c2 time steps are not enough so that all
initial connectivity components can be affected at least once. 
So far we have seen, that using a single strategic agent the optimal convergence time is upper bounded
by O(n2) and using 9n strategic agents the optimal convergence time is upper bounded by the constant
2. Next we deal with the case in between these two extremes.
Theorem 17 For each α ∈ [0, 1] we have f(n, nα + 12) ∈ O(n2−2α).
Proof. As usual, we assume that the non-strategic agents are ordered with respect to their starting
opinions, i.e., x1(0) ≤ · · · ≤ xn(0). In a first step we use our strategic agents to influence each non-
strategic agent at most once in order to guarantee that after this step the connectivity components have
either a low width or a high density, i.e., many members compared to the corresponding width. We will
formulate our reasoning in the style of an algorithm, which we then analyze later on.
Step 1:
(1.1) t← 1, h← 1, u← nα + 12
(1.2) let C be the connectivity component in G′t with h ∈ C
(1.3) if xh(t) + 4 ≥ xr(C,t)(t) then
h← 1 + max{i : i ∈ C}
if h > n then STOP else go to (1.2) end if
end if
(1.4) k ← |{i ∈ C : xh(t) ≤ xi(t) ≤ xh(t) + 4}|
(1.5) if k > (nα + 12) /12 then
if xh+1(t) + 4 ≤ xr(C,t)(t) then
h← h+ 1, go to (1.4)
else
h← 1 + max{i : i ∈ C}
if h > n then STOP else go to (1.2) end if
end if
end if
(1.6) choose a, b ∈ C with xh(t) + 1 ≤ xa(t), xb(t) ≤ xh(t) + 3 and xa(t) < xb(t) such that xa(t) = xb−1(t)
(1.7) if u < 6k then
t← t+ 1
u← nα + 12
go to (1.3)
end if
(1.8) place 3k strategic agents at xa(t)− 1 and xb(t) + 1 each
(1.9) u← u− 6k
(1.10) if xb(t) + 4 ≥ xr(C,t)(t) then
h← 1 + max{i : i ∈ C}
if h > n then STOP else go to (1.2) end if
else
h← min{i ∈ C : xi(t) > xb(t) + 4}
go to (1.3)
end if
By t we denote the current time, by h we denote the index of a non-strategic agent that we do not have
considered before, and by u we denote the number of strategic agents that we can still use at time t.
In (1.1) we initialize these three variables, i.e., we start at time t = 1 with the first non-strategic agent
h = 1 and still can use all m = nα + 12 strategic agents.
By C we denote the connectivity component of agent h at time t. Whenever we change h to a
non-strategic agent outside of C we go to (1.2) in the remaining steps of the algorithm.
In (1.3) we check whether the so far unconsidered part of C is rather short. If this is the case, we
increase h to a non-strategic agent of the next connectivity component. Here h > n is used as a stopping
criterion.
Reaching (1.4), we can assume xh(t) + 4 ≤ xr(C,t)(t) and denote the number of non-strategic agents
with an opinion at time t from the interval [xh(t), xh(t) + 4] by k.
In (1.5) we check whether there are many, compared to the number of strategic agents, non-strategic
agents with an opinion in the mentioned sub interval of the opinion space of length 4. If this is the case,
we increase the index h.
Reaching (1.6), we can assume k ≤
≥1︷ ︸︸ ︷
(nα + 12) /12 and choose two non-strategic agents a, b ∈ C
satisfying certain technical constraints. The existence of a, b ∈ C can be concluded from the fact that the
non-strategic agents of C are connected, so that the interval [xh(t) + 1, xh(t) + 3] of length 2 contains at
least two different opinions of non-strategic agents at time t.
In (1.7) it is checked if we can still use 6k strategic agents at time t. If not, the time is increased to
the next time step.
Reaching (1.8), we can assume that we can still use 6k strategic agents at time t. (1.8) describes
the precise placement of the strategic agents and (1.9) performs the bookkeeping of the number of used
strategic agents.
In (1.10) we ensure that any subsequent placement of strategic agents in (1.8) will not interfere with
non-strategic agents treated so far.
After a finite number of time steps the algorithm of Step (1) stops with h > n. There exists exactly one
place in the algorithm, where t is increased by one, i.e., sub step (1.7). Since here the condition u < 6k
is satisfied, at least (t− 1) · nα2 strategic agents have been placed in total. In (1.4) and (1.8) we ensure
that each 6 placed strategic agents correspond to a non-strategic agents without double counting. Thus,
the algorithm of Step (1) finishes after O
(
n1−α
)
time steps.
In (1.8) strategic agents are used to split connectivity components. To be precise, we have
xa(t+ 1) ≤ 3k · (xa(t)− 1) + 1 · xa(t) + k1 · (xa(t) + 1)
3k + 1 + k1
≤ xa(t)− 1
2
,
where k1 ≤ k − 1. Similarly, we deduce xb(t + 1) ≥ xb(t) + 12 , i.e., xb(t + 1) − xa(t + 1) > 1. We
remark that any placement of strategic agents in the subsequent operations does not clash with our
previous placement of strategic agents, even if they are performed at the same time t. To be more
precise, if two strategic agents are placed at the same time within the range
[
xl(C,t)(t), xr(C,t)(t)
]
of the
same connectivity component, then their distance is either zero or at least 2. If two strategic agents are
placed at the same time in two different connectivity components, then there do not exist non-strategic
agents which are influenced by both strategic agents, since the opinions of the two strategic agents are
within the ranges of the respective connectivity components.
There are exactly two reason why the algorithm of Step (1) does not further split connectivity
components. Either they have a low width or a high density. If the condition in (1.5) is satisfied at
time t, then at time t + 2 agent h is contained in a connectivity component with density, i.e., number
of non-strategic agent in the connectivity component divided by its length, at least n
α
144 . Note that
the first and the last sub interval of length 4 might not have a high density, while the remaining part,
i.e., those agents where the condition in (1.5) applies, must indeed have a high density, since otherwise
the connectivity component would have been partitioned into several connectivity components by the
algorithm. It is easy to check that the remaining connectivity components have a width of at most 8
after Step (1) has been completed.
In Step (2) we will get rid of the small connectivity components with a low density. We treat each
non-strategic agent at most once starting from h = 1. The time for Step (2) starts one time step after
the completion of Step (1).
Step 2: Let C be the connectivity component of our current agent h at the current time t. If w(C, t) = 0
we do nothing for h, i.e., we consider the next non-strategic agent. If 0 < w(C, t) ≤ 1 we again do
nothing and have w(C, t + 1) = 0 at time t + 1. If 1 < w(C, t) ≤ 8 and |C| ≤ nα2 , we place |C| strategic
agents at xl(C,t)(t) + 1 until the width of the connectivity component is at most 1, which happens after
at most 14 time steps, since the length of the interval is decreased by at least 12 at every time step. We
can clearly perform several such operations at the same time as long as we have a sufficient number of
strategic agents available. Since running off available strategic agents means that we have used at least
half of them, Step (2) can be done in O
(
n1−α
)
time steps.
Step 3: Let t be one time step after the completion of Step (1). At time t every connectivity component
with a width larger than 8 has a density of at least n
α
144 . Thus w(G′t, t) ∈ O
(
n1−α
)
. Also the number of
those connectivity components is in O
(
n1−α
)
. During the subsequent time steps some of these connec-
tivity components may split further. However, we will consider at most O
(
n1−α
)
different connectivity
components in the following sub steps, since each treated connectivity component has a width larger
than 1.
At a given time t we choose a connectivity component C with width larger than 1 and place all nα+12
strategic agents at xl(C,t)(t) + 1. Since the number of non-strategic agents at position xl(C,t)(t) is at most
n, this decreases the width of the corresponding connectivity component by at least 1
2n1−α . Thus, we
have w(G′t+1, t+ 1) ≤ w(G′t, t)− 12n1−α , so that it last at most O
(
n2−2α
)
time steps until all connectivity
components have width zero, i.e., the system has converged after the completion of Step (3). Note again
that connectivity components of width at most 1 collapse into connectivity components of width zero in
one time step. 
To illustrate the proof of Theorem 17 we consider our previous example again. Setting α = 14 , we
can use m = 14 strategic agents to control the HK system of the other n = 18 non-strategic agents.
The agents 1, 2, and 3 of the first two connectivity components of G′0 are skipped at (1.1), so that we
continue with h = 4. The number k of non-strategic agents with an opinion at time 0 within the interval
[xh(t), xh(t) + 3] = [3.6, 6.6] is given by k = 7. This number is larger than
nα
12 < 1, so that we increase h
in (1.2). Since 4.5 + 3 > 6.7 we skip the entire connectivity component consisting of the agents 4, . . . , 11
and continue with h = 12. Here the interval h(t), xh(t) + 3] again contains too many agents so that h is
set to 13. Also, the corresponding interval h(t), xh(t) + 3] contains too many agents, so that finally also
the fourth connectivity component is skipped. They last two connectivity intervals are skipped since
their densities of 83.1 ≈ 2.58 and 74.2 ≈ 1.67 are too high, i.e., at least as large as n
α
144 < 1. Since also the
density of connectivity component 2 is large enough, there is nothing to do in Step 2, so that we proceed
with Step 3. Since we have performed no real action, we still are at time t = 0. Agent 1 is already frozen.
Agents 1 and 2 are contained in a connectivity component with width at most 1, so that no external
influence is needed. At the next time step t = 1 they get frozen at opinion 1.95. Agents 4, . . . , 11
are contained in a connectivity component of high density and length 3.1. So, we place all m = 14
agents at time 0 at position 4.6. At time 1 the opinions of the non-strategic agents are given by x(1) ≈
(0, 1.95, 1.95, 4.53, 4.58, 4.69, 4.75, 4.86, 5.96, 6.18, 6.37, 10.35, 10.73, 11.63, 11.93, 12.28, 13.3, 13.75), i.e.,
agents 4, . . . 8 and agents 9, 10, 11 both form a connectivity component of width at most 1. Since the
width of the connectivity component of agents 12, . . . , 16 is larger than 1, we place all m = 14 agents at
time 1 at position x12(1) + 1 = 11.35. At time 2 all connectivity components have a width of at most 1,
so that the HK system has converged at time 3.
Lemma 18 For each α ∈ [0, 1] we have f(n, nα) ∈ Ω
(
n
2−2α
3
)
.
Proof. We set k =
⌊
nβ
⌋
, where β = 1−α3 , and consider the HK system of m = bn/kc dumbbel
configurations consisting of k−2, k−1, or k non-strategic agents each (in the construction of a dumbbel
configuration, we assume k ≡ 1 (mod 3)). Of course, we also have to assume that k is sufficiently
large. The possibly non-empty set of remaining non-strategic agents is placed far away from the other
m connectivity components at time 0. If not affected by at least one strategic agent, the convergence
time of an arbitrary dumbbel connectivity component is in Ω
(
n2β
)
= Ω
(
n
2−2α
3
)
. Within n2β time steps,
at most n2β+α of the m dumbbel connectivity components can be affected by at least a single strategic
agent. Thus, we have f(n, nα) ∈ Ω
(
n
2−2α
3
)
. 
We remark that for α = 0, we have m = 1, so that Lemma 18 improves the lower bound from
Corollary 13 to Ω
(
n2/3
)
. If we replace the use of many dumbbel configurations by the same number of
equidistant configurations an Ω
(
n
1−α
2
)
lower bound can be concluded.
4 Conclusion
We have demonstrated that the convergence times of Ω(n) of the equidistant configuration and of Ω(n2)
of the dumbbel configuration can both be reduced to O
(
n3/4
)
using a single strategic agent. It would
be very interesting to see optimized strategies and/or an improved analysis further reducing the upper
bound of the optimal convergence time for these two specific examples for m = 1. Given a concrete HK
system and a number m of strategic agents, the optimal convergence time might be determined using
an exact algorithm based on integer linear programming, similar to those ILP formulations presented in
[11, 16]. However, we do not go into details here and propose the development of (practically) efficient
exact algorithms for the optimal control problem of minimizing the convergence time in the Hegselmann–
Krause model as a research challenge.
We have further analyzed an example, where the optimal convergence time using a single strategic
agent is lower bounded by Ω
(
n2/3
)
. So, either this bound should be improved or the optimal convergence
time of the two previously mentioned examples is better than O
(
n3/4
)
. Since the upper bound for f(n, 1)
is still O(n2), it would be nice if the considerable large gap could be narrowed. If enough strategic agents
are available, any given HK system could be controlled in such a way that it converges in 2 time steps.
To be more precise, we have shown that m = 9n agents are sufficient. In some sense, the number of
strategic agents must be at least as large as a constant fraction of the number of non-strategic agents
in order to guarantee convergence in a constant number of time steps. So, we ask for the following
tightening: Given a constant c2 ∈ R>0, what is the minimum constant c1 ∈ R>0, of course depending on
c2, such that we have f(n, c1n) ≥ c2 for all sufficiently large n?
For the cases in between the two extreme situations of a single and that of very many strategic agents,
we have proven a smooth upper bound meeting the best known bounds for the extreme situations up
to a constant. However, we do not think that this general construction is tight. Indeed, there is a
considerable gap to the presented lower bound. So, we ask for improvements.
Instead of distinguishing the stable state as the desired state on can also ask for the minimal time
needed to reach a consensus. However, the resulting problem is rather similar to the one studied in this
paper.
Even without the presence of strategic agents there is a considerable gap between the best known
upper O(n3) and lower bound Ω(n2) for convergence in the 1-dimensional Hegselmann–Krause model.
As demonstrated by the example analyzed in [16], the estimation in the proof of the upper bound in [2]
can be tight up to a constant for Ω(n) time steps. So, it seems that additional ideas are needed.
All of our considerations were restricted to the one-dimensional case. The same questions can clearly
be asked for higher dimensions and then for different norms.
There are variants of the HK model where it is still not known whether the system converges or
not. One notable example is the heterogeneous version of a HK system, i.e., where the neighborhood
radii of the agents are not necessarily the same. Here, one strategic agents is sufficient to guarantee
convergence in a finite number of time steps. Another example is the Hegselmann-Krause dynamics on
the one-dimensional boundary of a circle assuming asymmetric influence ranges. For convergence results
on the circle in the absence of strategic agents we refer the reader to [8].
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